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8.1  Introduction 
This paper examines how the availability of annuities affects savings 
and inequality in economies in which neither private nor public pen- 
sions exist initially. The absence of widespread market or government 
annuity insurance clearly describes many less developed countries in 
the world today; it was also characteristic of virtually all countries prior 
to World War 11.  While there is now a considerable body of literature 
addressing the savings impact of funding or not funding government 
pensions (Barro 1974; Feldstein 1974; and numerous others), the effect 
of the insurance provision per se has received less attention. 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) is the first analysis of the pure insurance 
effects of  social security on national  saving. They demonstrate that 
when private arrangements are unavailable, the government’s provision 
of fully funded old age annuities alters household consumption possi- 
bilities.  In their model in which  agents have a bequest  motive, the 
short-run saving impact of such provision is ambiguous. Hubbard (1983) 
points out that this provision unambiguously reduces national saving 
if agents have no bequest motive. Fuller descriptions of life cycle (zero 
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bequest  motive) economies in the absence of  annuity insurance are 
presented in Eckstein et al. (1985) and Abel (1985). Both papers in- 
dependently derived the  stochastic steady  state properties  of  econ- 
omies in which agents involuntarily leave bequests to their children. 
Abel also  considers the effects  of  introducing a fully funded social 
security system into such an economy; his chief finding is that such a 
policy reduces savings.’ 
The assumption entertained by Eckstein et al. (1985) and Abel(l985) 
that completely selfish parents with no interest in their children leave 
involuntary bequests to their own children seems rather arbitrary. Clearly 
parents have the option to bequeath their wealth to surviving spouses, 
friends, other relatives,  or charitable organizations. In addition, the 
notion that bequests are completely involuntary seems implausible. An 
alternative assumption is that selfish parents and selfish children col- 
lectively pool the risks of the parents’ date of death in a manner that 
is mutually advantageous. There are three reasons why cooperative 
(voluntary) risk pooling seems a more realistic assumption. First, co- 
operative risk pooling Pareto dominates noncooperative behavior. Sec- 
ond, as described in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the risks of uncertain 
longevity appear to be very large; the amount of resources that mildly 
risk-averse, selfish individuals would surrender to have access to fair 
annuity  insurance is potentially  quite  sizable.  This  suggests  a very 
substantial demand for market insurance if selfish parents cannot make 
comparable risk-pooling arrangements with their children, friends, or 
other relatives. Third, pooling longevity risk with even a single child 
can capture a large fraction of the gains from perfect insurance (Kotli- 
koff and Spivak 1981); hence, such risk pooling with children appears 
well “worth the trouble,” with the gains far exceeding any reasonable 
transaction costs. 
This paper models cooperative risk pooling of  selfish parents and 
children taking into account the arrival of future selfish family members, 
namely, unborn grandchildren, great grandchildren, great great grand- 
children, and so on. At  each point in  time the anticipated arrival of 
additional agents with whom young family members can share risks 
influences the set of current risk-sharing arrangements that are of mu- 
tual advantage to young and old family members. As a consequence 
the solution to the bargaining problem between currently living family 
members takes account of the infinite sequence of bargains struck by 
family descendants. 
In addition to modeling the process of  sequential generational risk 
sharing, we calculate, for the CES utility function, the stochastic steady 
state level and distribution of wealth. These calculations suggest that 
perfecting annuity insurance can have major impacts on national sav- 
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perfect annuity insurance reduces wealth by 35%-60%  in the long run. 
The exact percentage reduction in savings within this range depends 
on assumptions about the cooperative bargaining solution. These fig- 
ures are large, and larger still if  one assumes a greater degree of risk 
aversion. 
Given  our  parameterization  of  preferences,  the  35%-60%  range 
should, however, be viewed as an upper bound for the impact of  in- 
troducing what amounts to a fully funded social security system in an 
economy with family risk sharing. There are two reasons why these 
figures are likely to considerably overestimate  the  actual outcome. 
First, they are partial equilibrium estimates, that is, they do not take 
account of potential changes in factor prices (wages and interest rates) 
that would arise, in a closed economy, from a major reduction in na- 
tional  wealth.  Such price  changes can  significantly dampen savings 
reductions in models of  this kind.  Second, in order to highlight the 
impact  of  insurance provision,  we  assume that  at most two family 
members are alive simultaneously. This generates the smallest possible 
risk sharing within families. Obviously, a sufficiently large number of 
family members is capable of pooling virtually all risks of uncertain 
longevity. With large enough families sharing mortality risks, the effect 
on aggregate wealth of  perfecting insurance provision could be quite 
small. 
While these numbers are partial  equilibrium estimates and inten- 
tionally biased upward by our modeling of family size, they are sur- 
prisingly large relative to our prior beliefs. They suggest that the in- 
surance aspects of social security are potentially as important in altering 
national savings as is the method of social security finance. It is also 
worth pointing  out that the transition to the full annuity insurance 
equilibrium is completed once the initial generation of young family 
members reach old age. In real time, this is 40-50  years, but one would 
expect to see most of the ultimate change in savings occurring within 
the first 20 years. A final point that aids in evaluating these findings is 
that full insurance, while generating a Pareto-efficient steady state, may 
involve a steady state level of welfare that is lower than the minimum 
level of welfare in the family insurance stochastic steady state. This 
somewhat paradoxical result is explained as follows: the provision of 
full insurance transfers resources to the first cohort of elderly at the 
expense of initial young and future generations. While the new steady 
state is efficient, it has a smaller stock of resources, in this case capital, 
because of the initial transfer. This transfer to the initial elderly is not 
effected by explicit redistribution across age groups.  It arises more 
subtly, namely, from the inability of young family members to continue 
selling insurance to their parents in exchange for their parents’ potential 
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children, provision of perfect annuities, which involves each cohort’s 
pooling risk with its own members, permits the initial generation of 
elderly to consume at a higher rate. The initial set of children as well 
as all future generations are better off because of the perfection of the 
insurance market, but worse off  because they no longer receive in- 
heritances. Since all children in this paper are born with identical en- 
dowments, eliminating inheritances by providing perfect insurance also 
eliminates inequality. 
The next section presents the infinite-horizon bargaining model; the 
zero bargaining, involuntary bequests model is also presented for pur- 
poses of comparison. This section also describes the algorithm used 
to solve the bargaining problem. Section 8.3 discusses the process of 
wealth transmission in the stochastic steady state. Section 8.4 compares 
long-run stocks of wealth under (1) perfect annuity markets, (2) three 
alternative parent-child bargaining solutions, and (3) no-insurance ar- 
rangements with involuntary transfers made to children. This section 
also considers how the presence of additional children would alter the 
findings. Section 8.5 summarizes the paper  and  discusses  ideas for 
additional research. 
8.2  The Model 
As a prelude to presenting the selfish family, infinite-horizon bar- 
gaining problem, this section briefly reviews wealth accumulation under 
perfect annuity markets.  In the subsequent  modeling of  family risk 
sharing, each selfish parent reaches a bargain with a single selfish child 
regarding the risk of long life. This is the simplest of family structures, 
but the associated intergenerational bargaining problem remains mod- 
erately complicated. The final part of this section describes how our 
stylized economy operates when family bequest-annuity agreements 
do not exist, but where involuntary bequests are made to children as 
in Eckstein et al. (1985) and Abel(l985). In this case it is everyone for 
himself; that is, there are no risk-pooling opportunities to ameliorate 
the risk of long life. 
In  comparing the economy  under  these three insurance  arrange- 
ments-perfect  insurance, self-insurance between parent and child, and 
no insurance-it  is important to distinguish between transition effects 
and steady state comparisons. Clearly, if we move from no insurance 
to a family deal or from a family bargain to perfect insurance, the first 
generation gains. These gains are due to the fact that the generation 
alive during the switch received an inheritance from its parent but gives 
none or one of smaller expected value to its children. Kotlikoff and 
Spivak (1981) estimated that these gains to the first generation could 
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year-old male who gains no pleasure from leaving bequests and whose 
time-separable consumption preferences are isoelastic, with a relative 
risk  aversion  coefficient of  .75.  This individual would  consider the 
introduction of a perfect annuities market equivalent to an increase in 
his (her) wealth of 47%; with perfect annuities, there is no need to 
maintain precautionary balances to provide for an extraordinarily long 
life,  and the individual  can, therefore, enjoy a higher  consumption 
stream for the remainder of  his (her) life. The gains to those who first 
get access to a perfect annuities market increase with the age and degree 
of risk aversion of the individual. For uninsured individuals the gains 
to deals within the family are also large. With two participants the gain 
is roughly half that offered by perfect insurance, and with three it is 
roughly 70% as great. Hence, one would also expect significant start- 
up gains in moving from zero to family insurance. 
This paper, in contrast to Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), concentrates 
on steady state comparisons of the three insurance environments. In 
the case of  family insurance we look at situations where a parent is 
insuring with a child, the child later makes a deal with his child, and 
so on. The analysis of aggregate wealth requires consideration of the 
entire family history of  insurance arrangements and mortality experi- 
ence. Obviously, the consumption and saving of current family mem- 
bers depends on their inherited wealth, which depends on the sequence 
of wealth and death dates of all previous ancestors. 
There are 4 periods of life in this model. People live with certainty 
for the first 3 periods and survive to the fourth with probability P. So, 
the fraction (1 -  P)  of the population live only 3 periods, while P live 
4  periods. Children are 1 period when their parents are 3. Any nego- 
tiation or deal, explicit or implicit, between parent and child takes place 
before the parent and child engage in their respective third- and first- 
period consumption. 
Individuals  are  exogenously  endowed  with  earnings.  The  time 
pattern of the receipt of these earnings greatly influences saving and 
wealth  in  the  economy.  We  assume  that  no  earnings are received 
in  the  fourth period  of  life  and  examine a number  of  patterns  of 
income  receipt  in  the  first  3  periods.  Consumers  are  modeled  as 
maximizing expected  lifetime utility  subject to one or more budget 
constraints.  Utility  is taken as separable  in consumption  (C,) over 
time. 
The perfect annuities case is by far the simplest to analyze since an 
individual's  choice problem is separate from that of his parents and 
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subject to 
where P, is the probability of surviving to period t (PI  = P2 = P3 = 
1, and 0 < P, < l), C,  is consumption in period t, R is the discount 
factor (one divided by one plus the interest rate), a  is the pure time 
discount factor, and W1 is the present value of  earnings. Throughout 
this paper we use the isoelastic form for U(C,), 
where 1 - y is the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. 
The parameter y measures the (constant) degree of relative risk aversion. 
The solution to the consumer's problem in the case of  perfect an- 
nuities takes the form 
(3)  w,  (Ra)"-  "y 
j=  1 
Knowing C, and the time pattern of earnings one can derive the ac- 
cumulated wealth of each cohort. Total wealth in the economy equals 
the sum of each cohort's  wealth holdings. 
The family insurance solution where each member acts solely out of 
self-interest  is  much  more  complicated. When  the bargaining takes 
place the parent is age 3 with one more period of certain life followed 
by one period of uncertain life. The agreement reached by parent and 
child can be thought  of  as the parent's  buying an annuity from the 
child. In return for some money in period 3 (the price of the annuity) 
the child promises to offer a specified level of  support for the parent 
in period 4 in the event that the parent lives that long. Equivalently, 
the deal can be arranged such that the child gives the parent some 
money before period 3 in return for being made beneficiary of the will 
of the parent. The equivalence can be seen in the following example 
which assumes a zero rate of interest for simplicity: say the parent 
pays $1 for an annuity that gives him $2 in period 4 of his life should 
he live. In the equivalent  support-for-bequest arrangement the child 
gives the parent $1 in period 3 in return for the parent's  agreeing to 
save $2 for this fourth period and makes the child his beneficiary should 
he die at the end of  period 3. In both of these arrangements the child 
makes a net transfer of $1 to the parent if  the parent lives to old age 
and receives $1 if the parent does not. Regardless of  how the bargain 
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of the parent’s life span. Perhaps the simplest way to think about these 
deals is the first way, the purchase of annuity insurance by the parent 
from the child. The next issue to address is what is the price of this 
insurance. 
Both the parent and the child can be made better off by striking a 
bargain. However, there is some indeterminacy as to how the surplus 
will be divided.  One can imagine the price of the annuity being set 
sufficiently high that the parent’s utility is just the same as if no deal 
had been struck, and, therefore, all of the gains from trade go to the 
child. At some low price, all of the gains from trade would go to the 
parent. An additional complication is that the child, in striking an ar- 
rangement with the parent, considers the third-period bargain he will 
make with his own child. The expected utility from that future bargain 
is denoted p  and depends on the child’s level of third-period wealth, 
Ws3,  that is, v = Q(Ws3).  Throughout the paper we assume that suc- 
cessive children all earn identical amounts with certainty in the first 
three periods of their lives. Hence, the resources  of the grandchild, 
with whom the child will bargain, is suppressed as an argument of p. 
The frontier of the utility possibilities space with intergenerational 
bargaining is located by solving the following problem: 
Maximize 
subject to 
Cf3  + Cs, + NCf4  + Cs2.J + R2Ws3., = W,, + W,/R 
and 
cf3  + csl  + RCs2.d + R2Ws3,d =  wsl + wf3/R, 
where C,  and Cf4  are the parent’s certain and contingent consumption 
in  periods  3  and 4, respectively;  C,, is the child’s first-period con- 
sumption, and Cs2,*  and C,,,, are the child’s second-period consumption 
contingent upon the parent being alive or dead in period 4, respectively. 
The child’s certain present value of  resources is  Wsl,  and his (her) 
parent’s third-period  wealth is  W,.  Finally,  Ws3,a  and  W,,,, are the 
third-period levels of  wealth of  the child, that he or she uses in bar- 
gaining with the grandchild, contingent upon the parent being alive or 
dead in period 4. 
Problem (4) involves maximizing a weighted sum of the two partic- 
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potentially ranges from zero to infinity. The child considers his con- 
sumption in periods 3 and 4 under two eventualities: either his parent 
dies early, and he, therefore, does not have to pay off  on the annuity 
insurance agreement (this is reflected in the final term of eq. [4] which 
is weighted by the [l -  PI  possibility of its occurrence), or the parent 
dies late and, hence, the child does have to pay off  on the annuity 
insurance (the fourth term in  eq. [4]). As stated, the  p(cw> function 
gives the expected utility the  child experiences from  his third- and 
fourth-period consumption discounted to period 3 of his life as a func- 
tion of his wealth in period 3. 
Equation (4)  has two budget constraints because total consumption 
plus savings for the child's  third period equals total initial wealth of 
the parent and child under both lifetime possibilities for the parent. 
The weight 8 reflects the terms of trade in this bargaining problem. In 
general one would expect 8 to be a function of the resources of both 
the parent and the child, W,  and W,,, respectively.  However, since 
W,, is constant in our analysis, we express 8 = OW,). 
Solving problem (4) for different values of  8 traces out the utility 
possibility frontier for family deals shown in figure 8.1. Obviously, not 
all values of  8 will generate outcomes that are in the core. We  have 
labeled as 8,  the critical value for 8 for which the parent receives none 
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We  define 0,  symmetrically with the parent getting all of the surplus. 
The point  T is the threat  point,  indicating the parent’s and  child’s 
expected utility levels if they fail to bargain with each other. As is clear 
from problem (4), figure 8.1 depends on the respective resources of the 
father and the son, W,, and W,,  and on the function Vs(-). 
Since we  consider  a  stationary  environment in which tastes  and 
endowments of children remain unchanged, we will limit ourselves to 
stationary bargaining solutions. That is, we assume that the V function 
will be the same for the bargaining of each successive pair of genera- 
tions. An implication of stationarity is that the parent’s expected utility 
in (4) expressed as a function of  his wealth,  W,,  equals the child’s 
expected  utility  function,  V,  when  the child becomes  a father. An 
immediate property of stationarity is that the child reaches the same 
deal with his child as his parent did with him if  respective resources 
are the same. More formally, a stationary solution is defined as a bar- 
gaining function e(  W,)  and an expected utility function V(  W) such that 
if Ci, Cf: are optimal values of consumption derived from solving prob- 
lem (4), where V(W,,) is substituted for f(W,,), then 
1  1 
V(WfJ = -CJ-r  + (YP-c;&.v. 
1-Y  1-Y 
Solving problem (4) involves searching for a fixed-point function V 
and an associated O(W,)  function that produces outcomes that are in 
the core. We  consider and compute three solutions to problem (4). In 
the first solution, denoted O,, the child receives all the gains from trade; 
furthermore, all successive bargains involve children receiving all gains 
from trade.  In the second,  Of  solution, the initial and all successive 
fathers receive all gains from trade. In the third solution the gains from 
trade are always divided between  child  and  son according to John 
Nash’s (1953) two-person bargaining solution. 
In the 9,  solution parents receive their threat-point level of expected 
utility. This is the expected utility received by the parent if he acts on 
his own and is given by the solution to (5). Maximize 
subject to 
C,  + R  Cfd = Wf3IR. 
The structure of  the problem is very much like that with perfect an- 
nuities, except that providing for Cf4  costs R  instead of only PR. The 
advantage of  annuity markets is precisely  this reduced cost of con- 
sumption in periods where survival is uncertain. Denote V,(  W,)  as the 220  Laurence J. Kotliioff, John B. Shoven, and Avia Spivak 
maximum utility that the parent with wealth  W,  can achieve on his 
own by solving (5). Thus, V,(W,)  is the indirect utility function when 
no deal is struck and is given by 
where 
kI) 
k  = R~v-’[(l  + (CXP)’’~RT]Y. 
Naturally, V,( W,)  is the minimum the parent is willing to accept in an 
annuity bargain with his child. In addition, V, is the expected utility 
function of the child in the 8,  bargain with his own child. Replacing V, 
for V in (4) and choosing 8,  for each value of  Wf3  such that 
provides a proof by construction that V,  is a fixed-point function for 
the 8,  problem. In  addition  the computed values  of  8,  for different 
values of W,,  determine the function OS(Wj3).  While parents, in this 0, 
bargain, receive their threat-point levels of expected utility, their actual 
pattern of consumption differs from what they would choose on their 
own. As described below, C’  is smaller and C;,  greater than the re- 
spective solution values to problem (5). 
Although the V,  function was obtained analytically, this is not gen- 
erally possible. For the 8,  and Nash (denoted 8,)  solutions an iterative 
technique  described below is used  to find  fixed-point functions and 
their associated 8 functions. Both the 8,  and 8,  solutions require spec- 
ifying the child’s threat point. Given our assumption of a cooperative, 
efficient solution to father-son bargaining, the child, if he fails to bargain 
with his father, can credibly assert to his father that he will be able to 
reach a deal with his child. The child’s threat point, EU?, is the solution 
to problem (6);  it involves the child’s consuming C,, and CF2  in his first 
two periods, respectively,  and bargaining with his child in period  3 
based on third-period wealth, wSj. 
Maximize 
subject to 
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In the case of 6,  bargaining,  is replaced by  V,  in (6) as well as (4). 
The 0,  solution proceeds by first guessing a function Vf Next we solve 
(6) to determine the son’s threat-point utility EUT. Given the guess of 
V, and the derived value of EUT, 8 is chosen in (4) such that the son’s 
expected utility in the solution to (4) equals EUT. This last calculation 
is repeated for different values of W,,  thereby generating a function 
Or(W,).  In addition to computing a Offunction based on the initial guess 
of  V,,  the solution to (4) based on OJW,)  determines the father’s ex- 
pected utility in the bargain. The maximizing values of 
for different values of W,  provide an expected utility function for the 
parent in his Ofbargain with his child. This function is used as the next 
guess of the V,function,  and the calculations are repeated. The iteration 
proceeds until the guess of the V, function equals the father’s expected 
utility as a function of  W,,  that is, until we have found a function V,, 
which is a fixed point of the mapping described. 
In  the Nash  bargaining case a very  similar solution  technique is 
applied. The Nash solution involves choosing 8 in (4) to maximize the 
quantity (EU’  - EW(EU, - Em, where EU,and  EU, are the ex- 
pected  utilities  obtained by  the parent  and child, respectively, and 
EUf  equals V,, the parent’s threat point. To find V,,  the Nash fixed- 
point function, we again choose an initial guess of V,  and solve (6) to 
find EUT. We  also solve (5) to find EV.  Next the guessed value of V,, 
is  substituted  for  Q in  (4), and  0,  is  chosen to maximize  (EU, - 
EUf)(EU, - Em. Repeating this last step for alternative values of 
W,  generates a function O,(W,)  as well as an expected utility function 
of the father arising from Nash bargaining. This latter function is used 
as the second guess of the V, function. The iteration continues until 
we find a fixed-point function V,. In this bargaining solution as in the 
previous 8, solution, the OA  W,)  and e,( W,)  functions calculated in the 
last round of the iteration correspond to  the correct bargaining functions 
for the functions V, and V,, respectively. 
The V,  function is used as the initial guess of the V function for the 
e,  and Nash bargaining solutions. In each iteration we computed the 
solution to (4) for 80 different values of  W,.  We  then fit a fifth-order 
polynomial in W, to these points and used the resulting regression as 
the guess of V in the next iteration. The iterative procedure for deter- 
mining V converged roughly by the eighth iteration; 12 iterations each 
were used  for the 6,  and Nash  cases.  By “rough  convergence”  we 
mean  that economic choice variables  were identical to at least  the 
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W,  the calculated consumption  terms are identical to five digits be- 
tween iterations. While we believe more accurate values of the Vs  and 
V,,  functions could be obtained, the computation costs of achieving the 
additional accuracy is considerable; solving (4) for any one of the 80 
values of  W,  in any one of the 12 iterations requires rather extensive 
computation. 
8.2.1  The Involuntary Bequest Model 
The next case we examine is the situation in which there are no 
insurance arrangements but unintentional  bequests are made to chil- 
dren. This case has been examined in 2-period models by Eckstein et 
al. (1985) and Abel (1985). The solution differs from that of the threat 
points because the child inherits money unspent by the parent. The 
child in period  1  of  his life can observe the wealth of his parent and 
can calculate the potential inheritance, Z, he will receive should his 





Z = WnIR - C,. 
The child maximizes his welfare subject to the certain earnings en- 
dowment, Wsl,  and the inheritance Z left by the parent if he dies young. 
The V,  function gives the level of expected utility the child can receive 
in periods 3 and 4 with no deal with his child, that is, the solution to 
problem (5) above. 
8.3  The Transmission of Wealth in the Stochastic Steady State 
Figure 8.2 graphs the wealth of children in their third period (when 
they are parents) against their parents’ wealth,  W,,  for the case of 
family insurance bargains. The amount of  wealth the child brings into 223  Annuity Markets, Savings, and the Capital Stock 
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Fig. 8.2  Wealth  transmission functions and  the  steady state distri- 
bution of parents’ wealth 
his third period depends, of course, on the age at which his parent dies. 
The curves Wf3(W,)  and Wf3(Wf3)  indicate the third-period wealth of 
the child if his own parent lives for 3 periods and 4 periods, respectively. 
Note that the two curves intersect on the vertical axis, since a child 
whose parent has no wealth engages in the same consumption regard- 
less of  the date of his parent’s death. 
The exact position and shapes of these curves depend on the spec- 
ification of the utility function as well as the parent-child bargaining 
solution.  For the examples we describe here, the curves were con- 
structed by fitting fifth-order polynomials to the values of Wt3(  Wf3) and 
W:,(W,)  calculated for 80 different values of  W,.  The intercepts in 
each regression were constrained to equal the amount of  resources a 
child would save for period 3 assuming he engages in no bargain with 
his parent. In each calculation, the estimated curves were essentially 
straight lines, with  Wt3(  W,)  and  W:3(  W,)  monotonically increasing 
and decreasing W,,  respectively. 
Intuitively, Wf3(Wf3) rises with Wf3 because a fraction of the parent’s 
increased resources will be allocated to the parent’s contingent fourth- 
period consumption, Cf4.  If the parent dies after period 3, the additional 224  Laurence J. Kotlikoff, John B. Shoven, and Avia Spivak 
C,,  is passed on to the child. For the child the inheritance is allocated 
to larger second-period consumption as well as larger third-period sav- 
ings,  Wf3(W,),  that is, used in the bargain with his own child. The 
decline in Wf3( W,)  as W,  increases is explained as follows: regardless 
of  the bargaining solution between the parent and child, the parent’s 
contingent bequest rises with Wf3.  Part of  the price the child pays for 
the larger  contingent  bequest  is somewhat lower values of  second- 
period consumption and third-period wealth in the case the parent does 
not die young. This permits the parent to consume more in period  3 
and, potentially, in period 4. 
Assuming, as is verified in  our actual calculation, that the slope of 
Wf3  (W,)  is everywhere positive and less than unity,  Wf3,,,  is the 
unique limiting value of  a parent’s third-period wealth when all  his 
forefathers have died early. For values of W,  above Wf3,,,  successive 
early deaths of parents lead to smaller values of W,,  for each successive 
parent until the sequence converges to W,,,,,.  Similarly, starting with 
a value for Wf3  below W,,,,  and assuming that all  successive parents 
die  early  leads to successively larger  values  of  W,,  until  Wf3,,  is 
reached. 
We  next turn to the minimum bound on the stochastic steady-state 
distribution of  a parent’s wealth. If  the slope of  Wy3(Wf3)  is between 
0 and -  1, which is the case in the examples presented below, then 
Wf3 is the unique limit of  the value of a parent’s wealth as successive 
parents in a family continue to live through period 4.  In this case the 
sequence of W,s,  starting at any particular value, converges as a “Cobb- 
web”  to  Wf3;  that is, each successive parent with more wealth than 
Wf3,  who lives to period 4,  has a child who has less than Wf3 when the 
child becomes a parent. 
In the stochastic steady state W,,,,  is the lower bound on a parent’s 
third-period wealth. Values below W,,,,,  cannot arise in the stochastic 
steady state; any parent with W,  below W,,,,,  will have a child whose 
wealth as a parent is between W,,,,,,  and Wf3max.  Once the Wf3  for a 
particular family falls within Wf3mln  and W,,,,,  no parent in the family 
will ever appear with wealth outside this range. Values of  Wf3  below 
W,,,,,  and above Wf3,,, are nonrecurrent states in the Markov process 
that maps W,,  into Wt3(Wf3)  with probability  1 -  p and into W:,(W,) 
with probability p.  As can readily be seen by tracing out alternative p 
and (1 - p) sequences, starting with values of W, between W,,,,  and 
Wf3max,  the larger the value  of  W, in the preceding  generation,  the 
smaller will be the W,  in  the next generation if  the parent dies late. 
W,,,,,,  therefore, corresponds to the value of Wy3(  Wf3)  for Wf3max,  that 
is, Wf3,,,  = Wy3(  Wf3,,,).  Hence, if the richest parent survives to period 
4, his child is the poorest parent when he reaches period 3. This extreme 
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possible wealth, Wf3,,,,  provides the largest estate if he dies early but 
no estate if he dies late. In order to “purchase” the right to this largest 
potential  estate the child pays the largest price in terms of reduced 
consumption and third-period wealth if  his parent lives. 
Since the Markov process described in figure 8.2 is nonrecurrent, 
there are large regions between  Wf3min  and Wf3,,,  that have zero mass 
with respect  to the steady  state distribution of  wealth. The shaded 
areas in figure 8.2 chart this distribution for the case 8’s in which parents 
receive none of  the gains from bargaining with their children. This 
distribution was constructed by giving 100,000  families the same initial 
value of W,  and then simulating 2.5 successive generations using a 0.6 
probability of  a 4-period lifetime. The distribution of  Wf3  stabilized 
after roughly eight generations. Since we assume that a new generation 
is born every period, rather than every other period, there are also 
orphaned 2-period-old children as well as 2-period-old children with 
surviving parents who hold wealth at any point in time. Calculating the 
stochastic steady state’s stock of wealth requires simply summing the 
wealth holdings of all age 3 parents, the wealth of orphaned children, 
and the wealth of 2-period-old children and their surviving 4-period- 
old parents. The wealth holdings of these latter two groups are derived 
from the distribution  of wealth holdings of 3-period-old parents; the 
consumption of  each of the 100,000 parents and their children, when 
these parents are age 3, is subtracted from the income of these families 
to compute their combined saving. This saving plus each parent’s initial 
wealth represents the next-period wealth holdings of families consisting 
either of orphaned children or of children with surviving parents. Since 
this wealth distribution is stationary in the stochastic steady state, next 
period’s wealth holdings of these groups is identical to this period’s 
wealth holdings of such groups. Similar calculations are made for the 
case in which there are no insurance bargains  between parents and 
children, but children nonetheless inherit their parents’ estates. 
Parameter values were chosen as follows: the time preference factor, 
a,  and the discount factor, R,  both equal 36. The coefficient of risk 
aversion, y,  equals 4, and the fourth-period  survival probability,  p, 
equals 0.6. If one thinks of each period as consisting of 1.5  years, then 
a discount factor of  .86 corresponds to a 1% annual real rate of return. 
In addition, if  we view parents as being age  SO and children age 20 
when the bargains are struck, the 0.6 fourth-period survival probability 
is roughly equivalent to assuming an expected age of  death of 74. 
Table 8.1 presents  the calculated  values for a parent’s third- and 
fourth-period consumption at alternative levels of  W,  under perfect 
insurance, the three alternative parent-child bargains (the Of,  Nash, and 
8,  solutions to [6]), and the case of no-insurance arrangements. In each 
of these cases, the parent’s consumption increases with his third-period Table 8.1  Parent’s Consumption Under Alternative Insurance Arrangements 
Of  Bargain  Nash  0s Bargain 
Perfect  (Parents Receive  Bargaining  (Children Receive  No Insurance 
Parent’s Third-  Insurance  All Gains from Trade)  Solution  All Gains from Trade  Arrangements 
Period Wealth 







~  ~~ 
6.9  6.9  6.4  58  6.2  5.6  5.9  5.3  5.0  5.3 
6.7  6.7  5.7  5.2  5.5  4.9  5.2  4.7  5.3  4.6 
5.4  5.4  5.0  4.5  4.89  4.3  4.5  4.1  4.6  4.0 
4.6  4.6  4.4  40  4.2  3.8  3.9  3.6  4.0  3.5 
3.8  3.8  3.6  3.3  3.5  3.2  3.2  3.0  3.3  2.9 
3.4  3.4  3.2  3.0  3.0  2.8  2.8  2.6  2.9  2.5 
NOTE:  Table assumes y = 4, P  = .6, a = R  = .86. 227  Annuity Markets, Savings, and the Capital Stock 
wealth. Access to perfect insurance results, for this parameterization 
of utility, in higher levels of consumption for the parent in both periods 
3 and 4 relative to the other cases of partial or zero insurance. For 
example, if  the parent’s wealth is 4.4 at the beginning of period 3, he 
consumes 2.9 and 2.5 in periods 3 and 4, respectively, with no insur- 
ance, and 3.4 in both periods with perfect insurance. The present value 
difference in these consumption paths is 25%. 
A parent-and-child bargain in which successive parents receive all 
gains from  trade with  successive children, the  0,  bargain, provides 
parents  with consumption values  that are roughly midway between 
those of perfect and zero insurance. Consumption values for the parent 
under the Nash bargaining solution lie between the Ofand Os deals. This 
is the expected result since the Nash solution divides the gains from 
trade between parents and children. The Os bargain, in which the parent 
receives no benefits from dealing with his child, involves slightly less 
third-period consumption and slightly more fourth-period consumption 
when old than in the case of  zero insurance. 
Table 8.2 shows consumption and third-period wealth values of chil- 
dren in different insurance regimes. Under perfect insurance the child’s 
consumption is 3.4 in each period; with no insurance arrangements and 
no involuntary bequests the child consumes 3.2 during the first 3 periods 
and 2.8 in the last period. Depending on the parent’s wealth and lon- 
gevity and the bargain struck between the two, the child can potentially 
consume well in excess of the perfect insurance values. As an example, 
take the case of a parent with wealth of 6.0 who agrees to a O., bargain 
with his child. The child’s first-period consumption is 3.4, the same as 
under perfect insurance. If the parent dies after his third period, the 
child consumes 4.5 in period 2 rather than 3.4, the perfect insurance 
amount. Furthermore, the child’s third-period  wealth in this case is 
7.9, substantially  in excess of  4.4, the third-period  wealth of  a son 
under perfect insurance. With third-period wealth of  7.9, the child’s 
third- and contingent fourth-period consumption values are, from table 
8.1, roughly  5.5 and 4.9.  For  this  child the total  potential realized 
present value of consumption is 14.4, although the present value of his 
earnings is only 10. 
8.4  The Savings Impact of Alternative Insurance Arrangements 
Table 8.3 compares steady state per capita wealth stocks in the dif- 
ferent  insurance  regimes  under  alternative  assumptions  about  age- 
earnings profiles. Each of the age-earnings profiles has a present value 
of  10, which is received with certainty over the course of the first 3 
periods. Since the child’s resources are identical in each of these cases, 
the consumption decisions of  the child and parent are the same for Table 8.2  Child’s Consumption Under Alternative Insurance Arrangements 
Consumption and Wealth Values: Father-Son Bargains 
8,  Bargain 
(Children Get All 
Gains from Trade)  Nash Bargaining Solution 
Father’s 
Wealth  CSI  CSM  CS2D  WS3.A  WS3,D  CS1  CS2A  CS2D  WS3,A  WS3,D 
9.0  3.4  3.1  5.2  5.4  9.1  3.4  3.1  5.5  4.6  8.3 
8.0  3.4  3.1  4.9  5.4  8.7  3.5  3.1  5.2  4.6  7.9 
7.0  3.4  3.1  4.7  5.4  8.3  3.5  3.1  5.0  4.6  7.5 
6.0  3.4  3.1  4.5  5.4  7.9  3.5  3.1  5.0  4.6  7. I 
5.0  3.3  3.1  4.3  5.4  7.5  3.4  3.1  4.5  4.7  6.8 
4.4  3.3  3.1  4.1  5.4  7.3  3.4  3.2  4.4  4.7  6.6 
0,  Bargain 
(Childrcn Get No 
Gains from Trade) 
CSI  CS2A  CS2D  WS3,A  WS3,D 
Consumption Values 
No Insurance 
Arrangements and No 
Perfect Insurance  Involuntary Bequests 
CSI  CS2  CF3  CF4  CSl  CS2  CF3  CF4 
3.3  2.9  5.1  4.4  8.5 
3.3  3.0  4.9  4.4  8.1 
3.3  3.0  4.7  4.5  7.7 
3.3  3.0  4.5  4.5  7.3 
3.2  3.0  4.3  4.5  6.9 
4.6  6.7  3.3  3.0  4.2 
3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.2  3.2  3.2  2.8 
NOTE:  Table assumes y = 4, P = .6,  01  = R  =  .8h. Table 8.3  Wealth Per Capita and Percentage Long-Run Decline in Wealth from Switch to Perfect Insurance 
0,  Bargain  Bs Bargain  No Bargain 
(Parents Receive All  Nash Bargaining  (Children Receive All  Involuntary 
Gains from Trade)  Solution  Gains from Trade)  Bequests 
Perfect 
Age-  Insurance  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Earnings  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth 
Profile  Wealth  Wealth  Decline  Wealth  Decline  Wealth  Decline  Wealth  Decline 
(~O,O,O,O)  12.7  13.9  8.6  14.2  10.6  15.9  20.1  15.5  18.1 
(5.0,5.8,0,0)  7.7  8.9  13.5  9.2  16.3  10.9  29.4  10.5  26.7 
(3.3,3.9,4.5,0)  2.2  3.4  35.3  3.7  40.5  5.4  59.3  5.0  56.0 
(3.0,5.8,2.7,0)  3.4  4.6  26.1  4.9  30.6  6.6  48.5  6.2  45.2 
(2.0,5.8,3.5,0)  0.7  2.9  171.4  3.2  78.1  3.9  82.0  3.5  80.0 
NOTE:  Table assumes y = 4, P  = .6, a = R  = .86. 230  Laurence J. Kotlikoff, John B. Shoven, and Avia Spivak 
each of these earnings paths. Hence, the difference in stocks of wealth 
by row in table 8.3 are simply a function of the timing of  the receipt 
of labor income. 
The absolute size of  these economies’ wealth  stocks may appear 
small in comparison to the level of earnings or income in a particular 
period. However, such stock-flow ratios must be adjusted for the fact 
that flows in this model are received over a period that corresponds to 
roughly 15 years. In the case of the third and probably the most realistic 
earnings profile in  table 8.3, the ratio of wealth to one-fifteenth of a 
period’s  labor  earnings  is  6.9  in  the  case  of  the  0,  bargain.  A 
wealth/earnings ratio of 6.9 is somewhat greater than that observed in 
the United States. 
The percentage reductions in wealth from moving to perfect insur- 
ance reported in table 8.3 are very large. For the earnings profile in 
the third row the long-run wealth reduction is 59% starting from the 0, 
(children take all) stochastic steady state. It is 41% in the case of  an 
initial Nash bargaining equilibrium and 35% when the initial equilibrium 
involves 6,  (parents take all) bargain. 
The values in table 8.3 are highly sensitive to the shape of the age- 
earnings profile. The smallest percentage wealth reduction arises when 
all earnings are received in the first period; in this case wealth falls by 
20.1% starting from the 0, bargain and by  13.9% starting from the 0, 
bargain. 
The percentage change in  wealth appears relatively  insensitive to 
variations in the degree of relative risk aversion, y. For example, re- 
ducing y from 4 to 1.5 lowers the percentage decline in wealth under 
row 3’s earnings profile and initial 0, bargaining from 59.3% to 50.7%. 
Raising y to 8 increases the value to 63.2%. Under table 8.3’s first age- 
earnings profile the percentage wealth reductions starting from OS econ- 
omies are 15.1, 20.1, and 22.9 for values of y equal to 1.5, 4,  and 8, 
respectively. 
There is considerably more sensitivity to changes in the fourth-period 
survival probability P;  however, the sensitivity depends on the choice 
of earnings profile. For example, lower Pfrom  0.6 to 0.3, which reduces 
the expected age of death from roughly 74 to roughly 69, converts the 
59.3% 0, reduction (row 3, table 8.3) to 83.6%. The same reduction in 
P raises table 8.3’s row 1, 0, value from 20.1% to only 23.4%. 
The large differences in wealth stocks between the perfect insurance 
and family insurance regimes suggests that steady state welfare could 
actually be lower in the case of perfect insurance. This is indeed pos- 
sible. Under €lf(children  take all) bargaining and assuming y equals 1.5, 
the expected utility of even the child of the poorest parent exceeds the 
uniform, steady state expected utility under perfect insurance. Starting 
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expected utility level requires a 7%  increase in resources; achieving 
the expected utility of the child with the poorest parent in the 8,  sto- 
chasic steady state requires an 8% increase in lifetime resources, start- 
ing from this benchmark regime. Attaining the level of welfare of the 
child whose parent in the 8,  steady state has the maximum potential 
wealth, W,,,,,  requires a corresponding 12% increase in resources. 
The steady state stocks of wealth in the case of no family arrange- 
ments, but involuntary bequests to children, are slightly smaller than 
those under 8,  bargaining. This is not surprising since in both cases 
parents receive their threat-point levels of utility and consume roughly 
similar amounts. In the 8, deal, however, the child’s insurance provision 
leads to a somewhat lower level of the parent’s consumption in period 
3 and a somewhat higher level in period 4 (see table 8.1). In addition, 
given W,,,  the child consumes slightly less in period  1 in the 8,  deal 
than in the involuntary bequest setting. This consumption pattern ex- 
plains the larger wealth stock in the 8,  insurance regime. 
Another question raised by table 8.3 is the extent to which imper- 
fections in annuity markets can fully explain observed intergenerational 
transfers.  Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) invoked  the assumption of 
perfect insurance arrangements in estimating that roughly 80% of pri- 
vate U.S. wealth  corresponds to accumulated inheritances of those 
currently alive. This assumption that annuity insurance is fairly well 
developed in the United States can be defended by pointing to social 
security and other government annuities,  private pensions,  old age 
labor earnings that are partly contingent on survival, and the potential 
for family risk sharing involving multiple members. Still, it is interesting 
to ask how their calculation turns out when it is applied to the two- 
member family insurance economy described above. Their technique 
invo!ves  subtracting accumulated consumption from accumulated earn- 
ings for each cohort and then summing across cohorts to get a total 
wealth stock. This “life-cycle”  wealth is then compared with actual 
wealth holdings. If agents in the economy are selfish and annuity ar- 
rangements are perfect or very close to perfect, computed and actual 
aggregate wealth will be identical or extremely close to one another. 
The two-person family regime is, however,  quite far from that of 
perfect  insurance.  As  described  here, this imperfection  produces  a 
stochastic steady state in which observed consumption profiles often 
exceed what could be financed from one’s own labor earnings even 
under perfect insurance. Hence, in this economy, subtracting, for all 
cohorts, accumulated consumption, part of which is financed by past 
intergenerational transfers,  from  accumulated  earnings  produces  an 
underestimate of the economy’s actual wealth. For the 8,  bargain, with 
y equals 4  and with table 8.3’s  row 3 earnings profile, 1.5, the under- 
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mers’s (1981) calculation understates United  States wealth by  SO%, 
imperfections in annuity markets appear potentially  capable of fully 
explaining actual intergenerational transfers in the United States. 
8.5  Conclusion 
The preceding calculations as well as the figures presented in  table 
8.3 must be viewed cautiously. They embed rather extreme assumptions 
concerning the size of the risk-sharing pool and, in the 8,  case, the 
nature of risk sharing. A more realistic model would contain two par- 
ents pooling risk  with two or more  children.  Since the parents, by 
themselves, can provide each other with considerable insurance pro- 
tection, their threat-point values of expected utility are greater in col- 
lective bargaining with their children. As a consequence one would 
expect  parents,  in  such a model, to have  an expected  utility  level 
considerably greater than that described by the 8, solution. In addition, 
if they can extract most of the gains from trade from dealing with their 
children, they will end up with close to perfect insurance. In that case 
the impact of improving annuity arrangements on savings would be 
minor. 
Extending the analysis to different configurations of families is an 
area for future research. To  date we have considered the simplest case 
of  multiple children dealing with a single parent under the 8,  bargain. 
For table 8.3’s  third earnings profile the percentage reduction in wealth 
is quite similar to the 50% figure in table 8.3 over a range of children 
numbering as great as 5 per parent. Since their earnings profile implies 
very little saving in period  1, the change in the earnings’ age structure 
from a 1/5 ratio of children to parents has little impact on accumulated 
earnings of particular cohorts at a point in time. In addition, the con- 
sumption patterns of children and the parent are not greatly altered in 
moving from one to five children under the 8,  bargain. This would not, 
of course, be the case in the 8/ bargain. A 8,  bargain with five children 
would provide parents with close to the consumption levels available 
with perfect insurance. 
While the findings should be viewed cautiously, they do suggest that 
the manner in which annuity markets function can significantly affect 
saving, wealth, and welfare in an economy. That each generation has 
large incentives to improve annuity arrangements was demonstrated 
in  Kotlikoff and  Spivak  (1981). Here we  find  that the  steady  state 
welfare gains are significantly smaller and, in fact, may be negative. 
The first generations’ gain results in a smaller inheritance and capital 
stock for future generations. This lower wealth may more than offset 
the welfare gains that each generation receives from the availability of 
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We  should reemphasize that we are addressing a different question 
from that of Feldstein (1974) and others who are largely concerned with 
the funding status of social security. While that line of research attempts 
to estimate the  substitutability of  social  security wealth for private 
capital, we are here concerned with the insurance aspects of pensions 
and social security. It is our feeling, buttressed by the results of this 
paper, that a considerable amount of saving is potentially done for what 
could be loosely termed precautionary motives. In addition, the exact 
manner in which families self-insure can have major consequences for 
wealth accumulation. When more perfect insurance policies are made 
available, whether funded or not, less aggregate saving occurs. While 
we have focused on annuity insurance, the paper’s findings suggest 
that the availability of unemployment insurance, disability insurance, 
and health insurance could also significantly affect national saving. In 
addition, the government’s pooling of human capital risks through pro- 
gressive income taxation may also be having a major impact. In general, 
the study of savings and government insurance provision is an impor- 
tant area for additional research. 
Note 
1. This paper reaches a similar conclusion about the savings impact of per- 
fecting  insurance  arrangements,  although  we  model  the  initial,  no- 
market/government annuity economy quite differently.  Abel’s  research and 
ours were conducted independently. 
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Comment 
Models like the o 
Michael Rothschild 
e developed in this pa  er shed light on two issues. 
They can be used to assess how well different institutions work to share 
the risks of uncertain length of life. Because in the absence of perfect 
insurance people accumulate private wealth to insure themselves against 
poverty in their old age, these models are also used to analyze the 
effects of these different institutions on capital formation. My com- 
ments concern the first issue; I will discuss how I think the welfare 
consequences of  different  methods of  intergenerational risk  sharing 
ought to be measured. I will also indicate briefly how in one variant 
of the model analyzed in this paper, taxation can increase welfare. 
One of the several virtues of this paper is that it explicitly calculates 
the distribution of wealth which results from the inheritance process. 
If  there were perfect annuity markets, no one in this economy would 
leave an estate. Since everyone has the same ability to earn income, 
all people face the same lifetime budget constraint; all have, at birth, 
the same expected utility. When there are imperfect annuity markets, 
people leave estates. How much they leave depends on how long they 
live and how  much  they inherited from  their parents.  The bequest 
process thus induces a distribution of wealth. The characteristics of 
this distribution depend on the institutional structure; that is, it depends 
on the particular contract which fathers and sons make with one an- 
other. Because there is a distribution of  wealth in  societies with im- 
perfect annuity markets, different individuals have different expected 
utility at birth. Expected utility is determined by one’s father’s wealth, 
and this varies from person to person. 
This suggests using the following standard to compare welfare under 
different annuity arrangements: Suppose you were going to be born 
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into a society with a particular annuity structure. What is your expected 
utility if you assume a position in the wealth distribution according to 
the steady state distribution of wealth? This is, of course, the same 
thing as total utility in steady state using a utilitarian measure of welfare. 
This seems an appropriate criterion for this model as everyone is the 
same except for accidents of birth and length of life. Since they cal- 
culated the steady state distribution of wealth, Kotlikoff et al. could 
easily calculate this measure of welfare. It would be interesting to use 
this standard to compare the different imperfect annuity agreements 
discussed in the paper. 
From this perspective  there are three kinds  of uncertainty  in  the 
model. The first is uncertainty about how long one will live. Call this 
length-of-life uncertainty; it is the primary source of uncertainty. Other 
kinds  of  uncertainty arise because people cannot completely insure 
themselves against a long life. The second kind of uncertainty is un- 
certainty about how wealthy one’s father will be. (“Will be” because 
we are considering the thought experiment of being born into a random 
family.) Call this wealth uncertainty. Finally there is uncertainty as to 
how long one’s father will live and thus what bequest one will actually 
get. Call this bequest uncertainty. Bequest uncertainty causes real mis- 
allocation of resources.  Because I do not know what my wealth will 
be  until  bequest  uncertainty  is resolved,  1  cannot hope to allocate 
consumption over my lifetime as well as I could if  I knew what my 
lifetime budget constraint would be before I started consuming. 
With perfect  annuity  markets  none of  these kinds  of  uncertainty 
exist-or at least they can be perfectly insured against. If there are no 
annuity markets, then all three kinds of uncertainty exist. Intergener- 
ational risk sharing mitigates length-of-life uncertainty; it does this at 
the expense of increasing bequest uncertainty. The size of bequest risk 
is determined by the difference between the amount the son gets if his 
father lives 3 periods and the amount (possibly negative) the son gets 
if his father lives 4  periods. This difference is larger if the son partially 
insures his father than if he doesn’t. The larger, in the sense of second- 
degree stochastic dominance, are bequests, the greater is bequest un- 
certainty. I suspect that welfare is larger the smaller is bequest uncer- 
tainty. Bequests are smallest when fathers appropriate most of the gains 
from the annuity bargain. Thus, I think it likely that welfare or expected 
utility in steady state is highest when 0 = 0,.  What makes this a hunch 
rather thai, a conjecture is my inability to speculate about the effect 
of different values of 0 on wealth uncertainty. 
One institution which would increase welfare from the no-insurance 
situation is a 100% inheritance tax, with proceeds distributed in a lump 
sum fashion. Such a tax would have almost the opposite effect of the 
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life uncertainty, but it  would do away completely  with both  wealth 
uncertainty and bequest uncertainty. Such an inheritance tax would 
substitute for a market on which one could insure perfectly  against 
bequest  and wealth uncertainty.  It would be interesting to compare 
expected welfare in a society which had no annuities but which did 
have inheritance taxes with  expected  welfare in a society with the 
imperfect  annuities created by  intergenerational risk  sharing.  An in- 
heritance tax would make the imperfect annuity arrangements studied 
in this paper impossible.  It would also entail more capital in  steady 
state than would any intergenerational risk-sharing agreement. 